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Chinese Farmers’ Willingness to Accept Compensation to Practice Safe Disposal 
of HPAI Infected Chicken  
Abstract 
Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) is a high morbidity and mortality zoonotic 
disease, which threatens poultry and human health. An outbreak of disease in China 
requires strict slaughter and disposal of all chickens within a three-kilometer radius, 
incurring large private costs for farmers and encouraging black market transactions. A 
stated preference survey of 331 farmers across six provinces in China was conducted 
in 2015, in order to measure the responsiveness of farmers to accept various 
compensation prices for safely disposing of HPAI infected chicken. Findings suggest 
that about 25% and 40% of farmers in South and North China respectively would not 
adopt safe disposal at the current compensation price (10 yuan/bird) offered by the 
government. However, 80% of farmers would adopt safe disposal if the compensation 
price increased to 14.1 yuan in South China and 18.9 yuan in North China. The 
adoption of safe disposal by farmers was positively and significantly influenced by 
compensation price (p = 0.000) and regular contact with epidemic prevention staff (p 
= 0.094). However, adoption was negatively and significantly influenced by net farm 
income (p = 0.100) and chicken production income percentage (p = 0.014). Although 
half of (51%) of farmers were willing to receive zero compensation, a reasonable 
compensation scheme along with strengthened supervision, may be considered the 
most effective strategy to encourage safe disposal of HPAI infected chicken and 
reduce the risks associated with black market transactions.   
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In China, the total production of poultry meat between 1978 and 2013 ranked second 
in terms of volume throughout the world after the USA (FAO, 2016). Major animal 
epidemics, such as Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) are a serious threat to 
poultry farms and human health. HPAI virus subtype H5N1 outbreaks occurred 108 
times on poultry farms in China between 2004 and 2015. In that period, the number of 
poultry infected by HPAI was 391,032, and the number of poultry culled was 
32,660,585 (Shou Yi Gong Bao, various years). There is currently a lack of reliable 
data in terms of how many culled birds end up in the black market across China. 
Nevertheless, if dead poultry is carelessly disposed of or sold, it may result in various 
health and environmental hazards (Kalbasi et al., 2005; Karen et al., 2009). For 
example, the HPAI virus may spread if infected dead birds are not disposed of 
properly. The disease has infected humans in China; there have been three confirmed 
cases of human infection with HPAI subtype H5N1 since 2002 (WHO, 2016). 
Therefore it is important to study the willingness of poultry farmers to practice safe 
disposal options that have minimal health and environmental risks.  
In China, the first HPAI case took place in Guangxi province in 2004. Between 
2004 and 2015, there were 94 occurrences of HPAI in chicken flocks across 21 
provinces, each of which may have involved several holdings (Shou Yi Gong Bao, 
various years). Of these provinces, Hubei contained the most outbreaks followed by 
Xinjiang. Once HPAI was reported and confirmed by authorities, all poultry within a 
three kilometer radius of the epidemic point, whether infected or not, were required 
by law to be killed and then buried deeply or incinerated by local epidemic prevention 
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staff, in order to prevent HPAI from spreading further. Currently, the official 
compensation rate paid to farmers per culled bird is 10 yuan (approximately 1.54 US 
dollars), which is comprised of central government and local government funding, the 
proportion of which varies by region. The compensation price is much lower than the 
current broiler production cost (on average 48% and 36% of the production cost of 
white-feathered and yellow-feathered broilers respectively), as well as the retail 
market price (approximately 27% of the average Chinese retail market price in 2015) 
(China Animal Husbandry Information Network, 2015). As a result, farmers would 
incur significant economic losses if they were located within three kilometers of an 
HPAI outbreak.  
As rational agents, farmers compare the cost and benefits of disposal alternatives 
for HPAI infected chickens. One of the disposal methods is selling diseased chicken 
meat on the illegal black market, which is then resold to restaurants or chicken dealers. 
This method is also present in other countries; e.g. Bangladesh, where chicken 
farmers slaughtered infected chicken and either ate or sold them (Rebeca, 2012). 
Unsafe disposal methods give rise to two kinds of negative externality with a much 
greater cost to society. The first is that the chicken meat market may be impacted by 
diseased meat in the food chain, which is a negative externality on those producers 
selling healthy birds. Secondly, the untreated carcass may be a threat to human health 
if chicken meat was traded on the black market and then appeared in the consumer 
market. There is also a potential threat to the environment, such as the quality of soil, 
water and air (Bergeron and Gagnon, 2006).  
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Large positive externalities exist for epidemic disease prevention, yet private 
precautionary efforts are often lower than the socially optimal level (Stiglitz, 1988). 
Numerous countries have introduced policies that require farmers to adopt safe 
disposal. One such policy is to design economic incentives that motivate farmers to 
maximize public benefit, while pursuing their own profit maximization. However, if 
the compensation price does not meet the farmer’s reservation price (minimum price 
they would expect, which varies from farmer to farmer), there is a risk the farmers 
will not dispose of chicken safely, while overcompensation imposes a heavy financial 
burden on the government and may provide a disincentive to prevent disease. Thus to 
set a proper compensation price, both feasibility and efficiency should be taken into 
account.  
From the available data, it is difficult to assess how safe disposal adoption by 
chicken farmers is influenced by varying compensation levels, due to the reluctance 
of farmers to reveal non-adoption at existing compensation prices and insufficient (or 
no) variation of compensation prices across provinces and time. Hence a stated 
preference survey instrument has been designed to elicit the willingness to adopt safe 
disposal at different levels of compensation. The instrument ensures strict exogeneity 
of compensation prices with safe disposal adoption given the researchers selected the 
compensation levels exogenously. Meanwhile it is possible to investigate how 
willingness to adopt safe disposal is influenced by other farm and farmer 
characteristics, and whether there exists heterogeneity in farmers’ willingness to adopt 




2. Material and methods 
2.1 Chicken Production and HPAI Prevention in China 
Broiler production in China is characterized by white-feathered broilers in North 
China and yellow-feathered broilers in South China. Our survey data shows that 
white-feathered broilers’ delivery age is 46 days on average and the production cost is 
20.69 yuan per head, while for yellow-feathered broilers it is 102 days and 27.57 yuan. 
There were five provinces in North China and seven provinces in South China that 
made up the top 12 broiler production provinces between 2011 and 2013 (Table 1). 
Table 2 illustrates the provinces where HPAI occurred during the past 10 years, 
among which Liaoning suffered from the most infected dead and culled chicken on 
average per HPAI case.  
Farmers have two alternatives, namely safe disposal or unsafe disposal of HPAI 
infected chickens. It is assumed they know the disease status of every chicken. Safe 
disposal is a biosecurity procedure on chicken carcasses that minimizes the risk of 
dissemination of infectious agents (OIE, 2016). Safe disposal methods frequently used 
include deep burial, incineration, industrial oil refining and aerobic fermentation 
(Linton and Van, 2006). The other alternative is selling HPAI infected chicken on the 
black market, assuming no traceability back to the farm operation or repeated 
interaction between farmers and buyers. The (prospective) cost per culled chicken if 
safe disposal is adopted (without considering government compensation) is: CT 
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=C1+C2. C1 is the safe disposal fee paid by farmers and C2 is the opportunity cost of 
safe disposal, which has the market price as an upper bound. If farmers disobey the 
rules and choose to sell chicken meat on the black market, the cost per chicken would 
normally reduce to –C3+αC4 (search costs not considered). C3 is the price per chicken 
received on the black market, C4 is the fine per chicken for violation (usually collected 
by medical officers if black market activity is detected), and  is the probability of 
being caught. However, enforcement in China is loose and C4 is usually small, 
assuming farmers are actually caught. The penalty, once caught, is at most 3,000 yuan 
per holding (approximately 462 US dollars), which is regulated by the Animal 
Epidemic Prevention Law. The penalty accounts for around 5% of the mean annual 
net income calculated from our survey, which can be a considerable amount for some 
farmers while a negligible amount for others. Hence, given low expected penalties 
(probability of being caught times fine), some farmers are not deterred from operating 
illegally (selling chicken meat on the black market) if they wish to. Given that the cost 
of safe disposal and the cost of selling chicken meat on the black market are C1+C2 
and –C3+αC4 respectively, farmers compare the two costs and make a decision on 
which disposal method minimizes their private costs. The equilibrium for the safe 
disposal rate in this case would be sub-optimal because a numbers of farmers do not 
individually account for the social costs of using the black market in their 
decision-making.  
 While there are a few means for the government to use to increase the demand for 




When considered in the framework of principal-agent theory (e.g. Ross, 1973) 
farmers, as the agent, are well informed about chicken meat infected by HPAI, while 
the government, as the principal, knows little in the way of information about the 
farmers. Farmers are liable to pursue their profit maximization and choose to sell 
chicken meat on the black market. This scenario creates a conflict of interest and 
asymmetric information between the government and farmers.  
 In an attempt to disentangle the principal-agent problem, society as a whole 
would be better off if farmers followed government requirements under a close 
contract relationship and supervisory role. For example, the veterinary public health 
bureaucracy can enhance social welfare by encouraging precautionary biosecurity 
practices (Hennessy, 2007). Nevertheless, public veterinary authorities have limited 
ability to monitor and influence farmers' biosecurity actions (Hennessy and Wolf, 
2015). In rural China, the reality is that the government is often not fully aware of 
farmers’ animal epidemic situations due to insufficient grassroots veterinary services 
(Cai, 2005).  
 
2.2 Data collection 
The questions on farmers’ willingness to accept (WTA) from the pilot survey were 
readjusted according to Ruto and Garrod (2009)’s method1. Assuming the best 
                                                        
1 Farmers’ WTA was collected under eight compensation price levels from 0 to 20 yuan per culled 
chicken, in a pilot survey in Henan province in April 2015. It was found that eight levels of 
compensation price were too many and the interval between two prices too small for farmers to 
perceive any difference. The answers offered little variation on the price at which farmers were willing 
to adopt safe disposal. 
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outcome farmers can expect is full compensation of the explicit production cost if 
they adopt safe disposal, compensation levels were revised to 0%, 25%, 50%, 75% 
and 100% of the explicit production cost for that particular farm. This approach 
effectively divided the compensation into four quartiles, and expressing the 
compensation level as a proportion of production cost, was much better understood by 
farmers
2
. Using production cost as the compensation scale also offers a sufficiently 
large range, with the current official compensation level (10 yuan/bird) being between 
25% and 50% of the production cost on average. Farmers were informed what the 
explicit production cost consisted of during the interview. The multiple-bounded 
dichotomous choice (Herriges and Shogren, 1996) was used. The procedure carried 
out by interviewers involved telling respondents about a hypothetical circumstance: 
‘HPAI has occurred on your farm and many broilers have died of the disease’. During 
the interview, respondents were not informed of the consequences if safe disposal was 
not carried out. Then, farmers were asked whether they would like to adopt safe 
disposal without compensation, such as deep burial, incineration, industrial oil 
refining or aerobic fermentation. If they agreed to adopt safe practice, no more 
questions were asked on this matter. If not, farmers were asked about their willingness 
to adopt safe disposal if the compensation paid was 25% of the average production 
cost per boiler; and so forth up to 50%, 75% and 100% of the average production cost 
(assuming the farmer answered no to the previous compensation level). The 
percentage pattern was not stated during the interview and was kept hidden by trained 
                                                        
2
 An alternative reference easily understood by farmers would be the price per bird they normally 
receive. However, this was not used since production cost as a reference worked well with farmers. 
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interviewers to ensure farmers made their choices as honestly as possible, when 
presented with the various levels of compensation. A shortened version of the 
questionnaire is provided in Appendix A.   
With regards to the choice of survey sites, Hebei, Jilin and Shandong in North 
China were chosen, while Hubei, Guangxi and Guangdong in South China were 
selected. All questionnaires were conducted face-to-face between June and August 
2015, by interviewers consisting of one professor and four Ph.D. students in the 
research field of poultry farm management. A face-to-face interview is the most 
effective way to collect information on Chinese farm households and only the farm 
decision-makers were interviewed. Both the stratified sampling method (each of the 
six provinces being a stratum) and simple random sampling method were employed to 
decide the sample frame. Within each stratum, all of the chicken production towns 
were selected and codes made for them. Four to five towns were randomly chosen by 
lottery. In each chosen town, a complete list of broiler farmers was obtained and codes 
made for each farmer. Eventually, there were 27 randomly selected towns with 15 
farmers randomly selected from each town by lottery, resulting in a sample frame of 
405 farmers, including five farmers who refused to participate in the interview. In the 
end, 373 questionnaires were conducted, providing a response rate of 92% and, after 
checking the validity of the returned questionnaires, 331 were deemed as complete 
and usable, resulting in a valid response rate of 82%. The final cross-sectional sample 






2.3 Analytical methods 
The Contingent Valuation Method (CVM) was judged to be the most suitable tool 
available to use to measure non-market value. It has often been used to measure 
public goods and services (Loomics et al., 2000), and can also reveal farmers’ 
participation preference (Dupraz et al., 2003). However, there are few examples of 
farmers’ WTA for animal disease control (Bennett and Balcombe, 2012). In China 
there is no empirical investigation into farmers’ WTA for safe disposing of HPAI 
infected chicken, particularly in regard to different government compensation prices. 
Farmers’ WTA for safe disposal is mainly based on their private cost of safe disposal, 
and can be expressed as a latent variable influenced by their risk preference and 
subjective participation cost (Parks, 1995). Poultry belongs to farmers’ private goods, 
the price of which can be measured by the market. However, culled chicken infected 
by HPAI do not have a market value and their value can only be revealed by either 
black market transactions or compensation paid for safe disposal. Since black market 
data is not available, CVM is appropriate to measure their value through farmers’ 
WTA for safe disposal.  
 Regression is a commonly used method to analyze CVM data. Farmers’ WTA 
was expressed as a binary classification, one representing adoption and zero otherwise. 
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A logit regression model is illustrated below (Judge et al., 1988). Let p indicate 
farmers’ willingness probability for adopting safe disposal: 
                                                   (1) 
                                                 (2) 
Odds ratio of farmers’ compensation willingness for safe disposal is obtained: 
                                     (3) 
Equation (3) was converted to a linear equation through the logistic function form as 
follows: 
                                   (4) 
where y denotes a latent variable for safe disposal, and a farmer would adopt if y>0 
and not adopt if y≤0, X represents a vector of observed explanatory variables that 
influence farmers’ WTA including compensation, net breeding income, regional 
dummy, dependency on farm income, etc. β is a vector of parameters to be estimated 
and  is a stochastic disturbance.  
 The models were built based on the independent variables identified in the 
literature and are as well available in the survey. As a robustness check, a step-wise 
backward method was also used to individually exclude the insignificant variables. 


















































insignificant. The coefficient on compensation remains highly robust. Hence the final 
models are displayed with all independent variables in the paper.  
Compensation was measured firstly as a percentage of each broiler production 
cost; 0%, 25%, 50%, 75% and 100%, and secondly as a nominal cost (yuan /bird) 
expressed as a percentage, multiplied by the per broiler production cost that each 
respondent reported in the survey. The two measurements are used as independent 
variables in Models I and II respectively. Since the marginal effect is not linear with 
regards to compensation percentage or price, the marginal effect of one percentage 
point change in compensation was calculated, on the probability of safe disposal 
adoption at a range of compensation levels, from the regression results (Stata’s 
‘margins’ command). As the current compensation level (10 yuan) represents 48% 
and 36% of the production cost per bird in North and South China respectively, the 
marginal effects were calculated at compensation levels over the range of 30% to 70%, 
at an interval of 10%. The change in safe disposal adoption probability with regards to 
a 1% change in compensation price was also calculated, from 10 yuan to 26 yuan at 
an interval of 4 yuan. 
 
2.4 Variables influencing farmers’ WTA 
Besides compensation levels for safe disposal, other influences on farmers’ 
willingness to adopt safety disposal were also collected, such as gender, age, 
education level, farm size, net income, percentage of total income that is earned from 
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chicken production, and whether the farmer has had regular contact with epidemic 
prevention staff. These variables were selected based on the review of relevant 
literature presented below.  
 Studies on farmers’ willingness to accept compensation for environment 
protection measures, animal epidemic disease prevention and control measures were 
reviewed with a particular focus on the influences on farmers’ WTA. Tender price is 
widely believed to have a positive influence on farmers’ WTA (Cooper and Keirn, 
1996; Cooper, 2003; Ruto and Garrod, 2009). With respect to farmer demographics, 
the role of gender and age on WTA has been studied extensively but appears to be 
inconclusive within the literature. For example, Dare (2014) found that male farmers’ 
WTA for forest protection was stronger than female. However, Willingnessiams et al. 
(2015) noted that female farmers’ WTA for dry saline lake recovery was stronger than 
males. Findings of Mooney and Barham (2013) suggested that older farmers had 
stronger WTA. Furthermore, Kathiravan (2007), Ruto and Garrod (2009), and Kumar 
et al. (2011) outlined that farmers’ WTA became weaker as their age increased. With 
regards to education, it is generally agreed within the literature that highly educated 
farmers have significantly weaker WTA (Mooney and Barham, 2013).  
 Farm traits are also significantly associated with farmers’ WTA. For example, 
Ruto and Garrod (2009) found that farm size had a positive influence on farmers’ 
willingness to participate in agricultural environment planning. Bateman et al. (1996) 
showed that net farm revenue per acre had a positive influence on farmers’ WTA for 
land expropriation. The possible reason is that larger farms are more likely to afford 
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such programs without a significantly negative impact on their profitability. However, 
if farm size became larger, farmers’ WTA bioenergy crops would decrease (Mooney 
and Barham, 2013). The argument is that larger farms would also incur much higher 
costs than smaller farms to implement or adopt certain practices, which makes larger 
farms, or those heavily dependent on ‘on-farm’ income, reluctant to adopt innovations 
or environment-friendly practices. 
 One of the key biosecurity approaches to prevent serious animal epidemics is for 
farmers to keep in frequent contact with their veterinary or livestock animal health 
specialist (Hernández-Jover et al, 2012). In every Chinese country town, epidemic 
prevention staff, employed by the government, provide official HPAI prevention 
services, and education and training to farmers regarding correct prevention measures. 
They also supervise regulation compliance and enforce legal provisions, such as 
culling chickens once an HPAI outbreak occurs. Hence we would expect that Chinese 
farmers, who are in regular contact with local epidemic prevention staff, to be more 
likely to practice safe disposal.  
 
3. Results 
Figure 1 displays the proportion of farmers willing to adopt safe disposal under 
different compensation levels in South and North China respectively. With the 
increase in compensation expressed as the percentage of production cost per bird paid 
to farmers, the proportion of farmers willing to adopt safe disposal has seen a 
sustained rise. The proportion in South China is also consistently higher than that in 
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North China under the same compensation level, except where all growers in North 
China and 98% of growers in South China are willing to adopt safe disposal at the 100% 
compensation level of production cost. This tends to suggest that chicken producers 
from South China have a stronger WTA than those from North China.   
3.1 Safe disposal adoption rate by compensation level and farmer sub-group 
Farmer adoption rates vary enormously by farmer and farm characteristics at a given 
compensation price, as shown in Table 3. The adoption rate of smaller sized farms is 
generally higher than that of larger sized farms. The adoption rate ranges from 34% 
(the big farm group with more than 50,000 birds) to 74% (the small farm group with 
2,000-9,999 birds) at zero compensation. This may partly be due to the 3,000 yuan 
penalty per holding for black market trading, which many small size farmers would be 
unable to afford. Female respondents were more willing to accept zero compensation 
than male respondents. Older farmers appear to have a stronger WTA than younger 
farmers. Adoption rates at the 0% and 100% compensation levels do not appear to 
vary much among farmers with differing educational attainment, while at other 
compensation levels, farmers with lower education have higher adoption rates than 
farmers with higher education attainment. With regards to net income per bird, 
farmers in the second lowest net income per bird category (1 to 2 yuan/bird) have the 
lowest adoption rate. In general, farmers are less likely to adopt safe disposal if their 
income from chicken production accounts for at least 50% of their total income. 
Farmers who maintain regular contact with epidemic prevention staff also seem to 
have a higher adoption rate. These farm and farmer characteristics, together with the 
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compensation level, will be used as independent variables in the subsequent 
regression analysis. The effect of each variable on adoption will be modeled 
simultaneously, so that the marginal effect on adoption of every variable can be 
calculated.  
3.2 Regression results  
Table 4 presents the detailed definitions and summary statistics for the dependent and 
independent variables. The dependent variable is binary and there are five 
observations per farmer, showing whether the farmer is willing to adopt safe disposal 
at each of the five compensation levels. 
Table 5 presents the marginal effects of independent variables on safe disposal 
adoption. Stata12.0 was the software package used for estimation. There was no 
serious multicollinearity in the models, and robust clustered standard errors were used 
to mitigate the effect of heteroscedasticity and account for the fact that each farmer 
has multiple observations within the dataset. Both Models I and II have reasonable 
prediction accuracy, i.e. 73% correctly predicted. Prediction accuracy increases as 
compensation percentage increases in general, for example, 64%, 66%, 64%, 73% and 
99% correctly predicted for each of the compensation levels 0 to 100%. Both 
measurements of compensation are highly significant and the results of other 
variables are very similar between the two models, suggesting the results are robust.  
The estimated marginal effect of ‘compensation percentage’ suggests that if 
compensation increases by one percentage point from the mean (50%), the probability 
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that farmers would adopt safe disposal will increase by 0.4 of a percentage point, 
assuming all other variables are unchanged. In Model II, if the ‘compensation price’ 
increases by one yuan from the mean (12.18 yuan) the probability of adoption will 
increase by two percentage points, again, assuming all other variables are unchanged. 
As expected, other factors significantly associated with a stronger WTA include: 
being located in South China, having a smaller net breeding income per bird, being 
less dependent on on-farm income, and having regular contact with local epidemic 
prevention staff. Finally, variables such as gender, age, education and breeding scale 
were found not to be significantly related to farmers’ WTA.  
The results in Table 6 show that the marginal effect of compensation on the WTA 
of South Chinese farmers decreases with compensation percentage, and the biggest 
increase in probability (0.42 of a percentage point per one percentage point increase) 
occurs at 30%. The biggest increase from North China occurs at 40%, where the 
probability of farmers’ WTA increases by 0.67 of a percentage point per one 
percentage point increase in compensation. In model II, as the compensation price 
increases, the change in safe disposal adoption probability also increases, with a 
maximum change occurring at 22 yuan for South China and at 18 yuan for North 
China. This suggests that, at the official compensation price (10 yuan), the response of 
farmers to safe disposal adoption based on a 1% increase in compensation price is not 
maximized. 
The effect of compensation on WTA is further explored by farmer sub-groups, 
given a high level of heterogeneity exists among farmers. For brevity, the marginal 
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effects were calculated based on Model I in Table 5 at the current average 
compensation level (10 yuan), being 48% of the production cost for North China and 
36% for South China. In North China, farmers with higher education attainment are 
more responsive to an increase in compensation percentage than farmers with lower 
education attainment, while in South China the opposite is true (Table 7). In both 
North and South China, farmers with a breeding scale of more than 10,000 birds (or 
maintaining regular contact with local epidemic prevention staff) are more responsive 
than farmers with a smaller breeding scale (or with no regular contact with local 
epidemic prevention staff). In North China, farmers who receive less than 50% of 
their income from chicken production are more responsive than those receiving at 
least 50% of income from chicken production. 
Using the regression results of Model II in Table 5, we can predict that in the 
event of an HPAI outbreak, more farmers in South China (75.83%) would be willing 
to adopt safe disposal than those from North China (58.54%) at the current 
compensation level of 10 yuan (Figure 2). This indicates there are almost 25% of 
farmers in South China and over 40% of farmers in North China who might sell 
chicken meat on the black market. Possible explanations for this difference are that 
chicken farmers in South China have a higher level of awareness because more HPAI 
cases have occurred (62 cases including Tibet between 2004 and 2015) compared to 
North China (32 cases over the same period). In addition, farmers in South China may 
perceive a higher risk of a HPAI outbreak than North China, given the much denser 





As Hennessy and Wolf (2015) argued, farmers are unlikely to comply with mandatory 
programs if the compensation does not provide them with a greater financial return 
than alternative action. Therefore, governments can expect there will always be a 
proportion of farmers who are unwilling to adopt safe disposal, when a compensation 
price is set. The results are useful for policy-makers to determine a compensation 
price level that encourages a reasonable proportion of farmers to adopt safe disposal, 
given local government budget constraints. For example, Figure 2 suggests that in 
order to achieve a target of 80% of farmers adopting safe disposal, the compensation 
price should increase to 14.1 yuan in South China and 18.9 yuan in North China, 
indicating that most chicken producers in South China are likely to accept 51% of the 
production cost on average. For a target of 90% adopting safe disposal, the 
compensation price should be increased to 28 yuan in South China and 25.8 yuan in 
North China, both prices being greater than their respective average production costs. 
The government, under this scenario, would incur a heavy financial burden. Another 
reality in China is that the epidemic prevention authorities do not always consider 
chicken farmers’ interests as a priority. Minimizing administrative costs is often 
pursued rather than allocating resources in HPAI management and epidemic 
prevention, or providing monetary assistance to farmers to reduce catastrophic losses. 
Nonetheless, whilst a high compensation price would ensure a higher safe disposal 
adoption rate, it is likely that overcompensation also provides a disincentive to 
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prevent disease (Hennessy and Wolf, 2015). Hence local authorities need to weigh up 
the cost and benefits of alternative compensation prices and, in the meantime utilize 
other effective measures, such as further development of the biodiesel market. 
Furthermore, allowing every province to set their own price, or a fixed 
compensation percentage based on each farmer’s production cost, may also be used 
by policy-makers to encourage safe disposal. Given the heterogeneity amongst 
Chinese chicken farmers  (i.e. average net breeding income is 27,808 yuan for 
farmers in Jilin province and 90,423 yuan in Hubei province), each province may set 
their own price based on key characteristics of their chicken farms, in order to achieve 
a targeted safe disposal adoption rate. A fixed compensation percentage based on each 
farmer’s production cost is another approach to deal with the heterogeneity among 
chicken farmers. This would avoid the situation of over-compensation to farmers with 
low costs, or under-compensation to those having high costs (i.e. free range, organic, 
etc.).  
In addition, the results suggest measures other than compensation need to be 
implemented in order to maximize farmers’ safe disposal adoption rates, such as 
closer supervision by epidemic prevention staff, particularly of farmers with higher 
net income and higher percentage of income from chicken production. The issue of 
penalties for black market trading and increased government supervision of black 
markets should also be considered, as any effective epidemic prevention strategy 
should be a balance between penalties and positive incentives. When penalties 
become significant and detection of black market trading is likely, it would 
considerably increase the cost of selling on the black market and increase the demand 
for safe disposal. Although the issues of penalties and government black market 
supervision have not been taken into account in the empirical investigation, they are 
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still important areas for policy makers to focus on. In particular, it is critical to explore 
the underlying reasons for loose government control, poor law enforcement and lack 
of black market supervision.   
A few limitations still apply to this study, which need to be addressed by future 
research. Firstly, the survey scenario of ‘HPAI is occurring on your farm’ implies that 
chickens have already been infected, which may explain the high safe adoption rate 
even at the zero compensation level. One would expect for farmers not infected, yet 
within a 3km radius of an infection site, to consider the situation 'unfair' and therefore 
these farmers are likely to be less willing to accept low compensation amounts. 
Secondly, many chickens died during the breeding process but the compensation rate 
was calculated based on the cost of chickens delivered. If the breeding age of 
chickens was short when dying of disease, the real production cost was much less 
than the delivered cost. Therefore, any compensation percentage or price set by the 
authorities would be more favorable to farmers whose chickens died of disease in the 
early breeding age. For effective safe disposal, setting compensation rates based on 
different breeding ages of HPAI infected chickens, may be of interest for further study. 
Thirdly, our study examines farmers’ intention (or willingness) to adopt safe disposal, 
which is not equivalent to actual adoption. The intention may not be put into practice 
if the farmer does not have complete control to perform the action (Ajzen, 1991). 
Finally, future studies may consider testing the robustness of setting different intervals 
and starting points
3
, if a large sample can be collected, or attempt to use a 
                                                        
3 For example, an unequal interval questioning design may reduce the possibility that farmers observe the pattern 
and simply wait for higher compensation levels.    
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non-hypothetical experiment, such as an auction experiment or real choice experiment 
with monetary payoffs to estimate WTA.  
 This study was the first attempt in China to investigate farmers' WTA 
compensation for safe disposal of HPAI infected chicken. Extensions of this 
methodology and subsequent results could be important for other developing 
countries affected by bird flu and confronted with the same problem, such as 
Indonesia (Simmons, 2006) and Nigeria (Ojimelukwe et al., 2016). 
 
5. Conclusions  
Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza is a disease that can be transmitted from animals 
to people and poses a serious threat to poultry and human health. An outbreak of 
HPAI requires strict infection control measures, such as the immediate slaughter and 
safe disposal of all chickens within a specific area. These controls incur large private 
costs for farmers, which in turn can encourage black market transactions, further 
increasing health risks. 
This study investigated the influences on farmers’ willingness to accept safe 
disposal methods of HPAI infected chicken, by examining responses to different 
hypothetical compensation prices. Farm and farmer characteristics were taken into 
account, and cross-sectional data was randomly collected from 331 broiler farmers 
across six Chinese provinces in 2015. Descriptive analysis suggests that safe disposal 
adoption differs greatly across farmer groups such as region, age, education level, 
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farm net income, farm size, chicken production as a percentage of income, etc. 
However, regression analysis suggests that only compensation, region, farm net 
income, chicken production as a percentage of income and contact with epidemic 
prevention staff are significantly associated with safe disposal adoption. 
Results suggest that at the current official compensation level, safe disposal 
practices for diseased chickens will not be maximized if compensation is increased 
only marginally. It is also evident that if the compensation rates are increased 
significantly, as outlined within the study, the adoption of safe disposal practices will 
be much greater. This is an important finding in managing what is a major threat to 




Yuan is Chinese currency unit (1US $=6.494yuan) on 13
th
 March 2016. 
26 
 





The authors thank Chen Wang, Rui Zhou and Yuzhou E’ for their assistance with the 
survey data collection and the support received from staff across seven chicken test 
stations in Henan, Hebei, Jilin, Shang Dong, Guangxi, Hubei and Guangdong 
provinces. This research is funded by the Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences 
through the Agricultural Science and Technology Innovation Program 
(ASTIP-IAED-2016) and the Ministry of Science and Technology of the People’s 
Republic of China through the project of Modern Agro-industry Technology Research 
System (CARS-42-G24). The comments and feedback provided by an expert reviewer 




Ajzen, I., 1991. Organizational behavior and human decision processes. Theories of 
Cognitive Self-Regulation, 50, 151-411. 
Bateman, I.J., Diamand, E., Langford, I.H., Jones, A., 1996. Household willingness to 
pay and farmers’ willingness to accept compensation for establishing a recreational 
woodland. Journal of Environmental Planning and Management, 39, 21-43. 
Bennett, R., Balcombe, K., 2012. Farmers' willingness to pay for a tuberculosis cattle 
vaccine. Journal of Agricultural Economics, 63, 408-424. 
Bergeron, N., Gagnon, M.F., 2006. The impact of mad cow disease in Quebec: 
what to do with animal carcasses? Journal of the Canadian Agricultural Economics 
Society, 7, 12-22. 
Cai, J., 2005. Flu Outbreaks Challenge Grassroots Epidemic Prevention System. 
Available at http://english.caijing.com.cn/2005-11-14/100013969.html (accessed 
09.03.2016). 
China Animal Husbandry Information Network. , 2015.Live Chicken Retail Price. 
Available at: http://www.caaa.cn/market/index.php?keyword=48 (accessed 
15.09.2016) 
China Animal Industry Yearbook Editorial Board, 2004-2015.China animal industry 
yearbook, China Agriculture Press, Beijing China. 
Cooper, J.C., 2003. A joint framework for analysis of agri-environmental payment 
29 
 
programs. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 85, 976-987. 
Cooper, J.C., Keirn, R.W., 1996. Incentive payments to encourage farmer adoption of 
water quality protection practices. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 78, 
54-64. 
Dare, A.M., 2014. Rural households’ access, willingness to pay (WTA) and factors 
influencing WTA for safe water and sanitation in southwest Nigeria, the Annual 
Meeting of the Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, Minneapolis, July. 
the United State. 
Dupraz, P., Vermersch, D., Defrahan, B.H., Delvaux, L., 2003. The environmental 
supply of farm households—a flexible willingness to accept model. Environmental 
and Resource Economics, 25, 171-189. 
FAO, 2016. Livestock primary database. Available at 
http://faostat3.fao.org/browse/Q/QL/E (accessed 02.03.2016) 
Hennessy, D.A., 2007. Behavioral incentives, equilibrium endemic disease, and health 
management policy for farmed animals. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 
89, 698-711. 
Hennessy. D.A., Wolf, C.A., 2015. Asymmetric information, externalities and 
incentives in animal disease prevention and control. Journal of Agricultural 
Economics, 4, 1-17. 
30 
 
Hernández-Jover, M., Taylor, M., Holyoake, P., Dhand, N., 2012. Pig producers’ 
perceptions of the influenza pandemic H1N1/09 outbreak and its effect on their 
biosecurity practices in Australia. Preventive Veterinary Medicine, 106, 284-294. 
Herriges, J.A., Shogren, J.F., 1996. Starting point bias in dichotomous choice 
valuation with follow-up questioning. Journal of Environmental Economic and 
Management, 30, 112-131. 
Judge, G. G., Hill R. C., Griffiths W. E., Lutkepohl H. and Lee T.C., 1988, 




Kalbasi, A., Mukhtar, S., Hawkins, S.E., Auvermann, B.W., 2005.Carcass composting 
for management of farm mortalities: a review. Compost Science and Utilization, 13, 
180-193. 
Kathiravan, G., Thirunavukkarasu, M., Michealraj, P., 2007. Willingness to pay for 
annual health care services in small ruminants: the case of south India. Journal of 
Applied Sciences, 7, 2361-2365. 
Karen, S.Y., Tim, E.C., Carol, J.C., 2009. Epidemiology of H5N1 avian influenza, 
Comparative Immunology. Microbiology and Infectious Diseases, 32, 325–340. 
Kumar, S., Mirajkar, P. P., Singh, Y.P., Singh, R., 2011. Analysis of willingness to pay 
for veterinary services of the livestock owners of Sangli district of Maharastra. 
Agricultural Economics Research Review, 24, 149-153. 
31 
 
Linton, P.J., Van, B.J., 2006. The development of a dynamic flux chamber system for 
the collection of gaseous emissions during on-farm composting of animal mortalities, 
the annual conference of the Canadian Society for Bioengineering, Edmonton, July, 
Canada. 
Loomics, J., Kent, P., Strange, L., Fausch, K., Covich, A., 2000. Measuring the 
economic value of restoring ecosystem services in an impaired river basin results 
from a contingent valuation survey. Ecological Economics, 33, 103-117. 
Mooney, D.F., Barham, B.L., 2013. What drives the adoption of clean agricultural 
technologies? An exante assessment of sustainable biofuel production in southwestern 
Wisconsin, the annual meeting of Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, 
Washington, August, the United State. 
OIE, 2016. Update on Avian Influenza. Internet data base. Available at 
http://www.oie.int/index.php?id=169&L=0&htmfile=chapitre_biosecu_poul_producti
on.htm (accessed 02.03.2016). 
Ojimelukwe, A.E.,Prakarnkamanant, A.,Rushton,J.,2016.Estimating the sensitivity of 
passive surveillance for HPAI H5N1 in Bayelsa state, Nigeria. Preventive Veterinary 
Medicine, 129, 58-66. 
Parks, P.J., 1995. Explaining irrational land use: risk aversion and marginal 
agricultural land. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 28, 34 -47. 
Rebeca, S., Rimi, N.A., Azad, S., Islam, M.S., Khan, M.S., 2012. Bangladeshi 
backyard poultry raisers ‘perceptions and practices related to zoonotic transmission of 
32 
 
avian influenza, Journal of Infection in Developing Countries,6, 156-165. 
Ross, S., 1973.The economic theory of agency: the principal's problem. American 
Economic Review, 63, 134 -139. 
Ruto, E., Garrod, G., 2009. Investigating farmers' preferences for the design of 
agri-environment schemes: a choice experiment approach. Journal of Environmental 
Planning and Management, 52, 631-647. 
Shou Yi Gong Bao HPAI., 2015. Internet data base. Available at. 
http://www.moa.gov.cn/zwllm/tzgg/gb/sygb/ (accessed 10.02.2016). 
Simmons, P., 2006. Perspectives on the 2003 and 2004 avian influenza outbreak in 
Balland Lombok. Agribusiness, 22, 435–450. 
Stiglitz, J.E., 1988. Economics of the public sector, Norton Press, New York the 
United State. 
WHO, 2015. H5N1 influenza number of reported cases. Internet data base. Available 
at: http://apps.who.int/gho/data/node.country.country-CHN/ (accessed 01.03.2016). 
Willingnessiams, R.B., Mitchell, D.M., Neill, C. L. and Benson, A., 2015. Household 
Willingness to Pay for Playa Restoration, the Southern Agricultural Economics 






Figure 1. Proportion of farmers’ WTA in different regions 






Figure 2 Percentage of farmers’ safe disposal adoption under various compensation 
prices 




Table 1 Top 12 boiler production provinces from 2011 to 2013    











Shandong 178.18 1 192.99 1 188.16 1 
Liaoning 87.64 5 91.21 5 89.67 5 
Henan 77.98 6 85.54 6 85.61 6 
Hebei 52.16 9 59.57 9 60.62 9 




Guangdong 105.20 2 107.45 2 100.10 2 
Jiangsu 97.21 3 102.27 3 92.33 4 
Guangxi 90.19 4 95.20 4 94.71 3 
Anhui 76.34 7 79.87 7 81.20 7 
Sichuan 60.82 8 65.10 8 66.92 8 
Hubei 52.16 11 46.90 11 49.07 11 
Jiangxi 39.97 12 41.23 12 42.84 12 





Table 2 Chinese provinces affected by HPAI and epidemic prevention staff (2004-2015) 


















Anhui 8 3437 63,941 202  
Guangdong 5 1579 53,831 434  
Guangxi 2 366 9806 630  
Guizhou 4 4317 148,369 214  
Hubei 13 1426 61,020 20  
Hunan 6 1238 49,171 202  
Jiangsu 2 2198 57,982 45  
Jiangxi 4 989 4924 68  
Sichuan 1 1800 12,900 246  







Gansu 2 230 399,638 84  
Henan 1 790 1810 102  
Heilongjiang 1 17,790 68,884 36  
Liaoning 5 115,405 19,958,777 1019  
Inner Mongolia 4 1002 25,128 66  
Ningxia 2 615 86,165 142  
Shanxi 3 8501 575,182 6  
Shaanxi 2 1148 58,405 114  
Tianjin 1 236 1287 9  
Xinjiang 11 1354 106,302 630 
Source: ShouYi Gong Bao (2004-2015) and China Animal Industry Yearbook (2004-2015).  




Table 3 Safe disposal adoption rates by farmer sub-group and compensation level 
 % of farmers adopting safe disposal  
 Compensation level 
Farmer sub-groups 0% 25% 50% 75% 100% 
All (n=331) 51.06 54.98 62.24 73.11 99.09 
Gender      
Male (n=286） 50.35  53.85  61.19   72.38  98.95 
Female (n=45) 55.56  62.22  68.89  77.78  100 
Age      
<=44 (n=149)  45.64   49.66  55.70  68.46    100 
45~59 (n=152) 55.26 58.55  65.79  75.66    98.03 
>=60 (n=30) 56.67 63.33  76.67  83.33  100 
Education      
Primary school and below (n=41) 53.66 60.98 68.29 78.05 97.56 
Junior school (n=195) 50.26 54.87 61.54 71.79 100 
Senior school and above (n=95) 51.58 52.63 61.05 73.68 97.89 
Farm size
 a
(number of chicken)      
<=1999 (n=6) 66.67 66.67 66.67 66.67 100 
2000~9999 (n=39) 74.36 76.92 76.92 79.49 97.44 
10,000~49,999 (n=214) 51.87 57.48 64.49 76.17 100 
>=50,000 (n=72) 34.72 34.72  47.22 61.11  97.22 
Net income (yuan per head)      
<=1 (n=110) 47.27 51.82 60.00 72.73 98.18 
1~2 (n=103) 42.72 49.51 58.25 68.93 100 
2~3 (n=61) 59.02 59.02 67.21 78.69 100 
>3 (n=57) 64.91 66.67 68.42 75.44 98.25 
Farm income accounting for the total 
income% 
     
<50%(n=38) 60.53% 65.79% 73.68% 78.95% 97.37% 
>=50%(n=293) 49.83% 53.58% 60.75% 72.35% 99.32% 
Contact with local epidemics 
prevention staffs 
     
Regular contact (n=202) 52.97% 56.44% 63.37% 74.26% 99.50% 
Non-regular contact (n=129) 48.06% 52.71% 60.47% 71.32% 98.45% 
Source: Authors’ own calculations. 
a
 Raising 0~1999 head, 2000~9999 head, 10,000~49,999 head, over 50,000 head annually represents 





Table 4 Variable measurement and descriptive statistics 
Variables Definition and assignment Mean Standard 
deviation 
Min.  Max. 
Dependent      
Safe disposal adoption Unwillingness=0; 
Willingness=1 
0.68 0.47 0 1 
Independent      
Compensation price Yuan/head 12.18 10.93 0 100 
Compensation %  0%, 25%, 50%, 75%, 100% of 
production cost 
50 35.37 0 100 
South China North China=0; 
South China=1 
0.54 0.50 0 1 
Contact with local 
epidemics prevention staff 
Non-regular=0; 
Regular=1 
0.61 0.49 0 1 
Chicken production 
income % 
% of total income 0.75 0.23 0.11 1 
Male Female=0; 
Male=1 
0.86 0.34 0 1 
Age Years 45.10 9.72 24 70 
Education Primary school or below=1 
(reference); 
Junior school =2; 
High school or above=3 
2.16 0.62 1 3 
Breeding scale Ten thousand heads  1.31 2.65 0.03 30 
Net farm income Yuan per chicken head 2.65 4.38 0.01 33.33 




Table 5 Estimation results of farmers’ WTA in logistic model 
 Model I Model II 
Independent variable Dy/dx Robust std.err. Dy/dx Robust std.err. 
Compensation % 0.004*** 0.0002  
Compensation price  0.02*** 0.001 
South China 0.21*** 0.04 0.18*** 0.04 
Male 0.003 0.06 0.01 0.06 
Age 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.002 
Junior school education 0.03 0.07 0.04 0.07 
High school education or above 0.01 0.07 0.04 0.07 
Breeding scale (natural logarithm) -0.04 0.02 -0.04 0.02 
Net breeding income -0.01* 0.01 -0.01** 0.01 
Chicken production income percentage -0.22** 0.09 -0.21** 0.09 
Contact with local epidemics prevention staffs 0.06* 0.04 0.07* 0.04 
Observation 1655  1655  
Waldchi2 (10) 375.23***  155.05***  
Pseudo R
2
 0.17  0.14  
% Correctly predicted 73.17  72.81  




Table 6 Change in probability of safe disposal given one percentage point change in 
compensation percentage (Model I) and one percent change in price (Model II) 
Model I Model II 
Percentage/% SC dy/dx NC dy/dx Price/yuan SC dy/ex NC dy/ex 
30 0.42 0.67 10 0.11 0.28 
40 0.38 0.67 14 0.14 0.35 
50 0.34 0.66 18 0.15 0.36 
60 0.30 0.62 22 0.16 0.33 
70 0.26 0.57 26 0.16 0.28 




Table 7 Marginal effect of samples in different characteristics at 10 yuan per culled 
chicken 
        North China  
(at 48% of production cost) 
South China  
(36% of production cost) 
Education        
Primary school and below          0.30%         0.56% 
Junior school 0.65% 0.39% 
Senior school and above 0.85% 0.32% 
Breeding scale/head   
<10,000 0.63% 0.33% 
>=10,000 0.71% 0.53% 
Net income/yuan   
<=1  0.65% 0.34% 
1~2  0.76% 0.50% 
2~3  0.57% 0.46% 
>3  0.72% 0.26% 
Chicken production income 
percentage 
  
>=50% 0.42% 0.40% 
<50% 0.70% 0.38% 
 Contact with local epidemic 
prevention staff 
  
Regular contact 0.64% 0.35% 
Non-regular contact  0.73% 0.45% 
Source: Authors’ own calculations. 
